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In the introduction to the first special issue, we referred to Hirschman 
and Berman’s much cited article of 2014, “Do Economists Make Poli-
cies?” which highlights the importance of what Science and Technol-
ogy Studies refers to as the socio-technical infrastructures of economic 
knowledge production and transmission (Hirschman and Berman, 
2014). We could also have referred to Eyal and Levy’s contribution in 
Mata and Medema’s HOPE conference volume on economists as pub-
lic intellectuals (2013), “Economic Indicators as Public Interventions,” 
in which the authors use the Foucauldian distinction between general 
and specific intellectuals to argue that economists do not gain their 
public traction so much as individuals, but rather through the institu-
tions in which they work or with which they are otherwise associated 
and through the tools they develop. Eyal and Levy then cleverly ap-
ply this argument to the rise to prominence of the GDP as an indica-
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tor of growth. In doing so, they show the close-knit relations between 
economic agents and the modes in which and arenas where they in-
tervened. In this issue we see similar relations between and within, 
for example, the Social Science Research Council, or OECD, and the 
tools and techniques developed and promoted to intervene in the 
public sphere. While John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, in different 
ways, concentrate their analysis of “public reason” on how a political 
society sets its priorities and agrees on its procedures of decision 
making, both Hirschman–Berman and Eyal–Levy remind us that the 
interventions of economists as a rule do not take place in the public 
arena, but gain their effectiveness from the way their tools shape the 
arenas of economic and political decision making, with National In-
come Accounting or Merton–Black–Scholes option pricing as stellar 
examples. This of course opens the door to the larger literature on 
how economists “perform” the economy. It is in this spirit that the 
initial conference behind these two special issues concentrated not on 
economists, but on economics and public reason. 
While the first issue, published as volume 9(2) of Œconomia, fo-
cused on the ethos of economists vis-à-vis their publics and on their 
means of expression (such as models and memos), this issue zooms in 
on the institutional settings in which and through which economists 
become socially and politically relevant. As we noted in the first is-
sue, and emphasize here again, the distinction may seem neat, but in 
the contributions to both issues we see many crossovers between the-
se themes. The institutional settings in which economists operate or in 
which economic tools and thinking are proposed or applied range 
from learned societies which created middle grounds between exper-
iments in households and emerging states, to ad hoc committees of 
economists that mediated between academic economic knowledge 
and hands-on economic policies, to international organizations that 
came to serve as vehicles for specific visions of economic policy. The-
se visions may be concerned with how to translate theories into ac-
tion, or with the promotion of specific tools that serve the same pur-
pose. The essays gathered in this issue also feature a concern with the 
travel of such theories and tools from centers of economic and politi-
cal power to the periphery or the reverse, including the resistance 
with which they are met and/or the need to adjust them to local cir-
cumstances.  
The first two essays find us at opposite ends of the British Empire. 
Aida Ramos uses her contribution to examine how the Dublin Society 
through the eighteenth century functioned as a collective that pro-
moted agricultural and other experimentation to improve the Irish 
condition, in the absence of a central government with other than ex-
ploitative interests. Lacking political clout, the Dublin Society pro-
moted economic innovations and experimentation via prize-schemes 
and, eventually, low-cost publications that spread new, experimental 
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knowledge to a wider audience. As with much of the knowledge 
produced at the time, this was not “pure economic” knowledge in the 
sense of high theory, but it consisted of a mixture of (especially) agri-
cultural and economic experimentation that facilitated the improve-
ment of local constituencies. While focusing on economic knowledge, 
Ramos’s contribution fits in the recent rise of interest in low-key sci-
entific initiatives that transgressed from the homely sphere of the 
family-economy into wider orbits of public conversation.  
With Sharmin Khodaji’s contribution we move from the colonial 
relation between England and Ireland to that between India and 
Great Britain in the early twentieth century. By then, there was a cor-
pus of classical political economic knowledge in Britain that was con-
sidered authoritative, especially when presented to its colonies. It was 
against this authority that a growing group of Indian-trained econo-
mists took a stance. Taking up Mahadev Givind Ranade’s appeal of 
1892 to develop an ‘Indian Political Economy’, these Indian econo-
mists aimed at a political economy that would no longer take its ex-
amples from Britain and Europe, but from Indian local conditions, to 
thus further the growing Indian nationalist creed. Khodaji examines 
how the British colonial administration responded by tightening its 
grip on Indian university teaching through the dissemination of text-
books that reaffirmed the truths of British political economy, yet 
modified their message by allowing the Millian caveat that the uni-
versal laws of political economy do not always manifest themselves 
identically because of disturbing causes coming in their way. Khodaji 
shows how Indian political economists in response increasingly drew 
on the ideas of Friedrich List and the German Historical School, at-
tracted by their focus on protectionism and the need for attention to 
the distinct conditions of different nations as against the classical free-
trade universalism. Some of these texts were intended as academic 
textbooks, while others were targeted at wider audiences but came to 
be used as textbooks as well. Thus, in the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, economic textbooks became the battleground to chal-
lenge the colonial vision of the Indian economy and to carve out an 
Indian road to economic development. 
With the second pair of papers we move to a more recent period in 
history, one in which institutional settings were becoming increasing-
ly formalized. Yet, more or less informal gatherings of economists 
created a space in which new methods of analysis and forecasting 
were ventured or policy advice was whispered that would cater to 
different audiences. Daniel Schiffman and Eli Goldstein tell the story 
of the organization of economic advice in Israel in the short window 
of time between 1952 and 1954 during which a group of American 
Jewish economists was contracted to help the Israeli government with 
the means and goals of economic policy. The young and embattled 
new state was clearly still under construction and highly dependent 
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on external financing for its survival. Using the public choice distinc-
tion between ‘learning’ and ‘signaling’, Schiffman and Goldstein ex-
amine how the Israeli government organized a committee of econom-
ic advisors, somewhat along the lines of the Council of Economic Ad-
visors to the US President. The cast of economic characters hired by 
the Israeli government consisted of high profile American Jewish 
economists, amongst whom was Abba Lerner. The government thus 
aimed to signal to an American audience a willingness to learn, yet it 
did so mainly to the largely liberal and democratic American Jewish 
community—not unimportant for its financial support, but far less so 
to the Eisenhower administration. The increased focus of the US gov-
ernment on the Israeli-Arab conflict also entailed a diminishing inter-
est from the Americans in this economic advisory board. Schiffman 
and Goldstein explain in fascinating detail how the economic adviso-
ry board lost its efficacy and was discontinued when it became en-
meshed in internal Israeli disputes over the meaning of economic 
planning, the weighing of long and short-term economic goals, and 
the importance of nation building over economic efficiency. It is a 
healthy reminder that the road to the performativity of economics is 
paved with failures.  
Reversing the relation between center and periphery, Juan Acosta 
and Erich Pinzón-Fuchs tell the story of the Committee on Economic 
Stability of the Social Research Council, which promoted the use of 
large-scale macro-economic models with even more detail than their 
original Klein and Klein-Goldberger examples, specifying these de-
tails to the level of parameters that could be plugged in for policy 
purposes. Given the fledgling status of empirical macro-economic 
modeling within high-profile economic research centers like Cowles 
in the United States, it is an unlikely story. Yet luminaries such as 
James Duesenberry, Franco Modigliani and, less surprising, Lawrence 
Klein were sitting in the Committee on Economic Stability, working 
towards a conference that would take lessons in the possible benefits 
of macro-econometric modeling for economic policy from smaller 
countries such as Japan, France, Norway, and the Netherlands. If we 
remember that Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen received, with Ragnar 
Frisch, the first Nobel memorial prize in 1969, this may be less sur-
prising, but with a waning of enthusiasm for notions of “planning” in 
the sixties (a notion of importance in Schiffman and Goldstein’s story 
as well), an exploration of the possibilities of macro-econometric 
modeling for policy purposes is remarkable. Though Acosta and Pin-
zón-Fuchs show how the status of participants at the conference on 
quantitative policy analysis organized at the Brookings Institute, with 
financial support of the Ford Foundation, was less than initially ex-
pected, these participants had exactly the right profile to promote 
quantitative macro-econometric modeling within important policy 
institutes such as the Fed. Acosta and Pinzón-Fuchs thus provide an 
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important building block leading to the famous Fed-MIT-Penn mac-
ro-econometric model. A more or less institutionalized group of 
economists interested in macro-econometric modeling and policy 
planning became an enabling device for the acceptance of quantita-
tive policy analysis within highly institutionalized settings such as 
the Fed.   
The last paper deals with economists within international econom-
ic institutes. Pedro Teixeira examines the extent to which ideas within 
the OECD about education changed over time. While Matthias 
Schmelzer recently claimed the early adoption of human capital theo-
ry within the OECD’s growth paradigm, Teixeira nuances 
Schmelzer’s account by distinguishing between such an adoption at 
the macro and micro levels. According to Teixeira, it amounts some-
what to a ‘truism’ that education contributes to economic growth, an 
argument regularly supported with reference to the factor labor in the 
Cobb-Douglas function and Solow’s growth theory. But causal claims 
about links between education, labor productivity growth, and the 
growth of GDP say little about how these links are brought about at 
the micro level. Teixeira then contrasts sympathies within the OECD 
for governmental support for education as a form of long-term plan-
ning for growth with what he takes as an essential element of human 
capital theory in the Mincer-Becker-Schultz program—that is, that 
individuals themselves invest in their own education according to 
market pay-offs. These two views entail very different conceptions of 
the functioning of labor markets. In the first case, labor markets are 
imperfect and in need of governmental steering; in the second case, 
they are institutions that can be left to themselves. Teixeira’s essay 
thus signposts the important point made in Eyal and Levy (2013), that 
economic expertise becomes political exactly when it is searching for 
neutral and technical modes of expression.  
The contributions found in this volume, covering three centuries 
of economic thinking about economic improvement and policy mak-
ing, bring to the fore developments in the types of institutional set-
tings in which such thinking finds its voice. Ranging across friendly 
societies such as the Dublin Society, evolving university curricula, 
more or less informal committees of economic experts, and staff 
economists working in the service of established international institu-
tions, the essays implicitly demonstrate the stabilization of economic 
knowledge and instrument making as a regular and continuing input 
in institutions which themselves came to serve as enabling devices for 
the functioning of the modern capitalist world and the governance 
enterprises that have at times attempted to (re)shape it. 
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* * * 
 
We would be remiss if we did not point out that this symposium 
issue would have contained a sixth contribution were it not for the 
untimely passing away of Evert Schoorl, after an illness that seemed 
to have waned. In March 2018 Evert was in a good mood and expect-
ing to come to Lausanne in May, but in mid-April it became clear his 
illness had returned and he would be unable to attend the workshop. 
Evert Schoorl was a well-known scholar of the work of Jean-Baptise 
Say, and within and outside of the Netherlands highly appreciated 
for his wit and support, especially for young, new students in our 
field. He was also an early participant in and promoter of research on 
the economist’s roles in the public realm and the broader transmis-
sion of economic ideas—projects in which the entrepreneurial work 
of one of us, Marco Guidi, and the late Bob Coats loomed so large. As 
a tribute to Evert’s person and scholarship, we are glad to have Bert 
Tieben’s obituary in this issue and dedicate this two-volume sympo-
sium to his memory. 
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